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A UNITARY THEORY OF STRICT DEFERENCE
Zach Huffman*
Agencies can interpret ambiguous statutes and regulations due to their
expertise in executing complex regulatory schemes and the presumption that,
for certain issues, Congress prefers agencies, not courts, to retain such
power. This proposition is commonly referred to as agency deference. A
recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Kisor v. Wilkie, challenged a core principle
of agency deference called Auer deference, which allows agencies to
interpret ambiguous regulations so long as the agency’s interpretation of the
regulation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation as a
whole. While the justices vigorously debated whether Auer v. Robbins
should have been overturned, Kisor stands for another principle. Kisor may
have created a new deference standard that this Note calls “strict
deference.” This Note argues that strict deference is a unitary deference
standard, which can be applied beyond contexts implicating Auer. Given the
Court’s concerns with another deference doctrine, Chevron deference, this
Note hypothesizes how strict deference would function in a Chevron context
by applying strict deference to three Chevron cases. This Note argues that,
just as strict deference applies to Auer cases, it can also be a relevant
standard for Chevron cases and one that addresses some of the criticism
levied at agency deference in general.
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INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the administrative state “wields vast
power and touches almost every aspect of daily life.”1 There are 454 federal
agencies2 adjudicating claims in such volume that they “tower over” the

1. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010)).
2. Agencies, FED. REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies [https://perma.cc/
LYV8-RYAT] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
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number of cases heard in federal courts.3 The sprawl of the administrative
state is potentially worrisome because federal agencies have wide latitude to
interpret and enforce statutes and regulations with limited oversight from the
judiciary.4 Agencies can do this despite courts holding the power to “say
what the law is.”5 Deference, however, is not a carte blanche for agencies to
interpret any rule they please; courts still maintain reviewing power.6 The
Supreme Court has formally incorporated this power into three deference
standards—derived from Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, Inc.7 (Chevron deference), Skidmore v. Swift & Co.8 (Skidmore
deference), and Auer v. Robbins9 (Auer deference)—applied to determine if
deference is appropriate when agencies interpret statutes or regulations. Auer
deference, in particular, has been the target of criticism arguing it violates
both the Constitution and congressional statutes.10 Despite questions about
the validity of the doctrine,11 in Kisor v. Wilkie,12 the Supreme Court upheld
Auer deference13—that agencies should receive deference for interpreting
their own ambiguous regulations14—and also redefined the standards under
which Auer deference would be granted.15
The new Auer test is a more discerning deference standard, which this Note
describes as “strict deference.” This standard is rigorous, designed to ensure
that an agency receives deference only in instances where (1) the agency
should qualify for it, (2) there are genuine ambiguities in the regulatory
language, and (3) the agency presents adequate reasoning for its
interpretation.16 In building this new standard, the Court assembled the most
demanding requirements of Auer, Chevron, and Skidmore together to create
a strict deference doctrine.17 The Court not only made it more difficult for
agencies to receive deference but it also created a singular, unitary deference
standard that could be deployed uniformly in all deference cases.18 Given
that Chevron has been criticized on terms similar to Auer19 and the Court has

3. See Kevin M. Stack, The Interpretive Dimension of Seminole Rock, 22 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 669, 673 (2015).
4. See infra Part II.
5. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
6. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018) (providing that courts maintain the power to review agency
decisions).
7. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
8. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
9. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
10. See generally John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996).
11. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
12. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
13. Id. at 2408.
14. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
15. See id.
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. See infra Part III.A.
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. See infra Part II.

2654

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

expressed a willingness to reassess Chevron,20 Kisor may have been the first
domino to fall. Changes to Chevron could be coming next.21
This Note argues that the Court’s new unitary, strict deference standard
can be applied to Chevron cases and illustrates this possibility through a
series of case studies. The case studies include two circuit court cases and
one Supreme Court case. They demonstrate that the strict deference standard
can protect against statutory and constitutional violations, while still allowing
the legal system to reap the benefits agencies provide. Accordingly, the
standard serves as a compromise between deference’s advocates and critics.
This Note will proceed in three parts. Part I outlines the Court’s traditional
deference doctrines. It then explains how Kisor updated Auer and ushered in
a new strict deference standard. Part II stakes out the debate over Auer
deference. Analyzing whether Auer should have been upheld highlights the
larger debate surrounding agency deference. Finally, Part III argues that,
beyond the debate to keep or discard Auer, Kisor implicitly offers a third
option by creating a unitary, strict deference standard that can be used in all
deference situations. Part III applies strict deference in the Chevron context
and argues that this standard takes advantage of the benefits agency deference
brings while still mitigating against its risks.
I. THE DEFERENCE DOCTRINES
Part I reviews the various deference doctrines. Part I.A addresses the
doctrines as they existed before Kisor. In particular, Part I.A.1 describes
Skidmore deference and its derivative, the hard look doctrine; Part I.A.2
addresses Chevron deference; and Part I.A.3 explains Auer deference. Part
I.B describes how Kisor amended the existing Auer test and created a new
deference standard.
A. The Traditional Deference Doctrines
Traditionally, courts have extended three types of deference: Skidmore
deference, Chevron deference, and Auer deference.22 Courts apply one of
these doctrines based on the type of agency interpretation. This section
enumerates the test for each deference doctrine and explains when they are
used.
1. Skidmore Deference and the Hard Look Doctrine
The least deferential of the deference doctrines is Skidmore deference.23
Under Skidmore, a court will adopt an agency’s interpretation of a statute or
20. See infra Part I.A.2.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Parts I.A.1–3.
23. See Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 508 F.3d 1332, 1334 n.1 (11th Cir.
2007) (describing Skidmore as the least deferential deference standard); Demahy v. Wyeth
Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 642, 647 (E.D. La. 2008) (finding that Skidmore is less deferential than
Auer and Chevron).
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regulation if the court is “persuad[ed]” that the agency’s interpretation is
correct based on a review of factors the agency considered in reaching its
decision.24 Such factors include whether the agency: (1) reviewed relevant
evidence thoroughly, (2) offered sound reasoning for its position, and (3)
took a position consistent with its other pronouncements on the subject.25
Courts are also entitled to consider other criteria, like congressional intent,
when deciding whether to accept the agency’s interpretation.26 Because the
standard imposes no obligation on a court to accept an agency’s decision,
Skidmore deference is “discretionary,”27 only used when a court is persuaded
by the agency’s interpretation.28
Skidmore can also be used to assess whether an agency’s policy decision
is arbitrary and capricious.29 In this context, Skidmore deference is referred
to as the hard look doctrine.30 Under this standard, an agency must consider
relevant information and explain satisfactorily the connection between the
facts in the case and the agency’s policy choice.31 While the Supreme Court
has not articulated a bright-line rule for when an agency’s choice can be
deemed a “clear error of judgment,”32 it has presented three instances where
the agency’s choice can be considered arbitrary and capricious: if the agency
(1) relied on factors Congress did not intend the agency to consider; (2) failed
to consider an entire important aspect of the issue for which it made a policy

24. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). The Court reaffirmed
Skidmore in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001).
25. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. Under Skidmore, although a court may make a ruling
consistent with the agency’s interpretation, it has not granted the agency deference. Instead,
the court makes a binding decision, which then becomes law unless a court overturns that
decision. See Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron
Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1156 (2012). For this reason,
Skidmore may more appropriately be considered a pleading standard. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 15–16, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (No. 18-15). Some believe that
Skidmore should apply in all cases because it allows judges to say what the law is. See, e.g.,
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448–49 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). This addresses one of the major
concerns with agency deference generally: that it allows for judicial abdication in violation
of both the Constitution and ratified congressional statutes. See infra Part II.
26. See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1188 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(viewing congressional intent as a factor to be considered when conducting a Skidmore
review).
27. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1250 (2007).
28. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1351–52 (2015) (citing
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
29. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018). A court reviewing an agency action must “hold unlawful
and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” that are determined to be “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id.; see also
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
46 (1983).
30. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46; see also Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 414 (1971).
31. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
32. Id. (citing Bowman Transp., Inc., v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286
(1962)).
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choice; or (3) offered an explanation for its decision that contradicts the facts
available to the agency.33
2. Chevron Deference
Courts grant Chevron deference when an agency interprets an ambiguous
congressional statute and acts reasonably.34 In Skidmore cases, it is
ultimately the court that decides the meaning of a statute or regulation.35
However, sometimes Congress intends for the agency to be a law’s
authoritative interpreter.36 To determine when it can defer to an agency’s
authoritative interpretive power, a court must first decide whether the case at
issue is one where extending Chevron deference to an agency is
appropriate.37 To pass this threshold, also known as Chevron step zero,38 the
agency must show that Congress granted it binding rulemaking authority and
that the agency exercised its rulemaking authority when it made its
interpretation.39 Once it determines that the agency acted pursuant to its
rulemaking authority, a court moves to Chevron step one and asks whether
the statute is ambiguous.40 If the statute is clear, the court must enforce the
statute as it is written and the agency receives no deference.41 However, at
Chevron step two, if a court finds that the statute is ambiguous, the agency’s
interpretation will be controlling so long as it is a “permissible construction
of the statute.”42 Summarized, an agency will receive deference if the statute
it interpreted is ambiguous and if its interpretation is reasonable.
Over time, courts have attempted to limit the scope of Chevron. One way
they have done so is by granting deference only when the statute is genuinely
ambiguous.43 In a recent Chevron case, Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United
States,44 where the Court addressed whether “money”45 included stock
options in a railroad pension plan statute, Justice Gorsuch established what
one commentator defined as a “‘clear enough’ standard.”46 To determine
33. Id.
34. See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
35. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
36. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
37. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
38. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 213–16 (2006).
39. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27. The Court found that the delegation of force of law
authority is demonstrated in various ways, such as an agency’s ability to administer
regulations through adjudications, notice and comment rulemaking, or by another vehicle of
“comparable congressional intent.” Id. at 227.
40. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 843. If an agency does not receive Chevron deference, it can still receive
Skidmore deference. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.
43. See infra Part I.B (describing how “genuinely ambiguous” is distinct from
“ambiguous”).
44. 138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018).
45. Id. at 2070.
46. Christopher J. Walker, Gorsuch’s “Clear Enough” & Kennedy’s Anti–“Reflexive
Deference”: Two Potential Limits on Chevron Deference, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE &
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that “money” was an unambiguous term, Justice Gorsuch looked beyond the
plain language of the provision at issue.47 He considered the statutory
language as a whole, as well as the structure and design of the statute.48
Christopher Walker speculated that Justice Gorsuch’s standard in Wisconsin
Central would possibly lead lower courts to “interpret ‘clear enough’ as more
searching than ‘clear’ or ‘unambiguous,’ thus narrowing the scope of
Chevron deference in the circuit courts,”49 because this review would require
analyzing more than just the plain meaning of the statute.50
Another way the Court has limited Chevron is to question whether, in
certain circumstances, Congress really intended for an agency to receive
deference on a particular issue.51 This inquiry arises when courts are faced
with statutory ambiguity concerning major policy questions or issues of
substantial political or economic significance.52 For example, in King v.
Burwell,53 the Court found that the answer to whether the Affordable Care
Act’s tax credits were available on federal exchanges implicated policy to
such a degree that “had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency,
it surely would have done so expressly.”54 This approach could solve what
Justice Anthony Kennedy has described as “reflexive deference”: the risk
that a court only conducts a cursory or perfunctory plain meaning analysis of
the text before granting Chevron deference.55 Even if it too quickly found
the statute at issue to be ambiguous, the reviewing court would still have to
determine contextual questions like congressional intent before granting
deference.56
COMMENT (June 22, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/gorsuchs-clear-enough-kennedys-antireflexive-deference-two-potential-limits-on-chevron-deference/
[https://perma.cc/H59V9QLM]. See also generally Wis. Cent., 138 S. Ct. at 2074.
47. See Wis. Cent., 138 S. Ct. at 2070, 2073–74.
48. See id. This type of analysis is in keeping with step two of strict deference. See infra
Part I.B; see also SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018) (considering
congressional intent and other statutory provisions to determine whether the agency should
receive deference).
49. See Walker, supra note 46 (quoting Wis. Cent., 138 S. Ct. at 2074). If Justice Gorsuch
meant “clear enough” to be a higher standard than unambiguous at Chevron step one, then his
standard has similarities to the genuine ambiguity requirement found in strict deference’s step
two. Justice Gorsuch’s analysis in Wisconsin Central, then, might suggest that the Court is
linking deference regimes into a unified doctrine and is pushing a strict deference standard in
situations beyond the Auer context. See infra Part III.A.
50. See Walker, supra note 46.
51. This limitation is otherwise known as the major questions doctrine. See Kevin O.
Leske, Major Questions About the “Major Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN.
L. 479, 480 (2016).
52. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 159 (2000) (“In
extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has
intended such an implicit delegation.”); see also Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the
Regulatory State: An Empirical Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 720 (2014).
53. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
54. See id. at 2483; see also Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986).
55. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
56. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 322 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“[W]e do not defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous provision unless Congress
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A third way to limit Chevron deference would be to incorporate the hard
look doctrine into Chevron step two.57 Under this framework, courts would
only defer to the agency’s interpretation if the agency could adequately
demonstrate that it reasonably interpreted the statute.58 This would raise the
low bar that agencies have traditionally faced at Chevron step two.59
Catherine Sharkey posits that the Court has already begun to implement a
type of hard look review in some of its cases.60 Additionally, circuit courts
may have implicitly created a Chevron step three, in which the agency’s
interpretation is reviewed under the hard look doctrine.61
3. Auer Deference
Because Chevron applies when an agency interprets a statute,62 the Court
devised a separate deference doctrine to assess whether agencies should
receive deference for interpreting their own regulations.63 That deference is
referred to as Auer deference.64 Under this doctrine, an agency will receive

wants us to, and whether Congress wants us to is a question that courts, not agencies, must
decide.”).
57. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting In on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV.
2359, 2385–89 (2018). Sharkey demonstrates how integrating the hard look doctrine into
Chevron might look by reviewing a recent decision. See id. at 2369–77 (analyzing Catskill
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, 8 F. Supp. 3d 500, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)).
In Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, the district court applied the
hard look doctrine at Chevron step two. 8 F. Supp. 3d 500, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d, 846
F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017). On appeal, the Second Circuit found that satisfying the hard look
doctrine is not required at Chevron step two. 846 F.3d 492, 523–24 (2d Cir. 2017). Applying
hard look at Chevron step two is similar to the hard look–like review that strict deference has
incorporated at its step one. See supra Part I.B.
58. See Sharkey, supra note 57, at 2385–89. This type of review is different than the D.C.
Circuit’s “Chevron step one-and-a-half,” where an agency must recognize a statute’s
ambiguity. See Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 757, 760 (2017).
59. Indeed, because courts take such a capacious reading of reasonableness, agencies
receive deference at Chevron step two 93.8 percent of the time. See Ken Barnett & Christopher
J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017).
60. See Sharkey, supra note 57, at 2412 (first citing Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,
136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016); then citing Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015)); see also
Catherine M. Sharkey, The Chevron–State Farm Framework: A New Age for Hard Look
Review at Step Two?, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Jan. 2, 2018), https://
blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-chevron-state-farm-framework-a-new-age-for-hard-lookreview-at-step-two/ [https://perma.cc/P4CH-MLAE] (citing Encino Motorcars, LLC v.
Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016)).
61. See Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 616 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In particular, MetLife,
Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016) exemplifies
Sharkey’s Chevron–State Farm model. See Sharkey, supra note 57, at 2433.
62. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991).
63. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965).
64. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). This deference standard is sometimes also
referred to as Seminole Rock deference. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S.
410 (1945). Scholars often use Auer and Seminole Rock deference interchangeably. See Stack,
supra note 3, at 669. This Note refers to this deference standard as Auer deference.
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deference when interpreting its own regulations unless the agency’s
interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”65
Like Chevron, the Court has placed additional limits on Auer deference
through case law. First, the Court has found that an interpretation made as a
“post hoc rationalizatio[n]”66 to defend its past actions in a litigation should
not receive deference because such an interpretation does not give sufficient
notice to regulated parties.67 Second, the Court requires that the regulation
be ambiguous before deference can be extended.68 Third, agencies cannot
receive Auer deference for interpreting regulations that simply restate or are
“near equivalen[t]” to a statute.69 Finally, the Court cabined Auer by granting
deference only when the agency’s interpretation is based on its experience
and expertise.70
B. Kisor Establishes a New Strict Deference Standard
In Kisor, the Court updated the traditional Auer standard. First, or at step
one,71 courts must look for markers to determine if Auer deference is
applicable.72 These markers include whether the agency’s interpretation is
authoritative,73 implicates the agency’s substantive expertise,74 and reflects
the agency’s fair and considered judgment.75 The Court was careful to note,
65. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461; see also Daniel E. Walters, The Self-Delegation False Alarm:
Analyzing Auer Deference’s Effects on Agency Rules, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 85, 95–96 (2019).
66. Auer, 519 U.S. at 462 (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212
(1988)).
67. See id.; see also Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 156 (2012)
(“To defer to the agency’s interpretation in this circumstance would seriously undermine the
principle that agencies should provide regulated parties ‘fair warning of the conduct [a
regulation] prohibits or requires.’” (quoting Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986))).
68. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000). An agency’s ability to
promulgate ambiguous regulations, which allows the agency to create de facto new regulations
through the interpretation of a vague regulation, remains one of the principal issues with Auer
deference. See infra Part II.B.
69. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006).
70. Id. at 256 (citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 454–55).
71. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1104 (6th ed. 2020)
(classifying the prongs of the new Auer test as “steps,” similar to the way scholars classify the
prongs of the Chevron test).
72. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2416–18 (2019). The Court previously held that
Auer does not apply in all regulatory contexts. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct.
1199, 1208 n.4 (2015); see also Christopher, 567 U.S. at 159.
73. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 553 U.S. 218, 257–
59 (2001)).
74. See id. at 2417 (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm’n, 499 U.S.
144, 153 (1991) (finding that an agency’s expertise puts the agency in a better position than
judges to make an interpretive determination)); see also Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v.
Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 167–68 (2007) (finding that agencies leverage expertise in conducting
factual investigations); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) (finding
agencies are better situated than judges to fill regulatory gaps because agencies are politically
accountable).
75. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417–18 (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204, 213 (1988) (finding that an agency will not receive deference if its interpretation is a
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however, that these markers do not constitute an exhaustive list.76 Rather,
they are meant to help guide a lower court’s inquiry into the “character and
context” of the interpretation to determine if Auer deference is appropriate.77
Assessing whether the case at issue is the type of case where Auer could
be applied is the same inquiry as is made at Chevron step zero.78 This test
asks whether: (1) Congress delegated force of law authority to the agency;
and (2) the agency’s interpretation was made in furtherance of that
authority.79 An agency must meet these requirements before even
considering whether a statute is ambiguous and therefore ripe for agency
interpretation.80 While the context and character requirements outlined in
Kisor are similar to Chevron’s threshold step zero, they are more rigorous.
Beyond just assessing whether the interpretation is of the type that can
receive deference, a court must also determine whether the agency
adequately presented a basis and explanation for why Auer should apply.81
This is similar to the type of justification required under Skidmore or the hard
look doctrine.82 Just as these doctrines are meant to ensure that agencies
ground their policy choices in rational, factually supported decisions,83
Auer’s character and context requirements ensure that only an agency’s
reasoned decision grounded in its expertise will qualify for deference.84
Requiring such justification to determine simply if Auer deference can apply
is a rigorous test that goes beyond the Court’s other threshold test established
by Chevron.85
If extending Auer deference is appropriate, courts move to step two: an
inquiry into whether the regulation at issue is genuinely ambiguous.86 To do
this, a court must exhaust all tools of statutory interpretation, including
analysis of the plain text, as well as the structure, history, and purpose of the
regulation.87 Auer’s new second step from Kisor requires a court to do more
than “wave the ambiguity flag just because it found the regulation
impenetrable on first read.”88 Courts must instead endeavor to find meaning
convenient litigation position or post hoc rationalization)); see also Anita S. Krishnakumar,
Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1823, 1825 (2015) (“In principle,
virtually everyone seems to agree that longstanding agency statutory interpretations should be
entitled to extra weight upon judicial review.”).
76. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416.
77. See id.
78. See supra Part I.A.2.
79. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
80. See id. at 226–27.
81. See supra Part I.A.1.
82. See supra Part I.A.1.
83. See supra Part I.A.1.
84. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2416–18 (2019).
85. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.
86. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588
(2000) (allowing an agency to interpret a regulation when it is not ambiguous would be to
allow the agency “to create de facto a new regulation”)).
87. See id. (“[O]nly when that legal toolkit is empty and the interpretive question still has
no single right answer can a judge conclude that it is ‘more [one] of policy than of law.’”
(quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991))).
88. Id.
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because hard questions of interpretation emanating from dense regulations
and statutes often can and should be resolved by judges.89 Requiring that
courts deploy all tools of statutory interpretation ensures that a regulation is
not just possibly, but is actually, ambiguous.90
Finally, at step three, if ambiguity still remains, a court must assess
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable and falls within a “zone of
ambiguity the court has identified after employing all its interpretive tools.”91
An agency will receive deference only if its interpretation of the regulation
addresses the narrow ambiguity defined by the courts.92 Accordingly, a
reasonable interpretation within the bounds of an identified genuine
ambiguity should receive Auer deference. Even at this final stage of the
analysis, this reasonableness requirement is one the agency can fail to meet.93
This level of review is more intense than its corollary in Chevron. At step
two of the Chevron analysis, agencies receive deference if the interpretation
of the statute is permissible.94 This is a low standard for an agency to meet
and is closer to the “plainly erroneous” deference conception of
reasonableness found in the previous Auer standard.95 In comparison, the
new reasonableness standard in Auer narrows the scope of deference to a
subset of the regulation.96 If the agency’s interpretation exceeds the zone of
ambiguity identified by the court in step two, the agency fails at step three
and receives no deference at all.97 As a result, what may be considered
reasonable is more constrained if the court defines the scope of ambiguity
than it would be if the court accepted the agency’s interpretation of what the
agency identified as the regulation’s ambiguity.98
89. See id.; see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687 (1995) (demonstrating the rigorous analysis the Court can engage in at Chevron step one);
cf. Raymond M. Kethledge, Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten
Years on the Bench, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 315, 320 (2017) (stating that as of 2017, Judge
Raymond Kethledge had never reached Chevron step two, always resolving the issue at step
one).
90. Ensuring a regulation is genuinely ambiguous fulfills the presumption that Congress
meant for the agency to have interpretive power when it purposefully speaks with ambiguity.
See supra Part II.A.
91. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 2415.
94. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
95. Compare Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (articulating the plainly
erroneous standard), with Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S.
44, 59 (2011) (finding the reasonableness standard is fulfilled if the interpretation was
“sensible”), and Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651 (1990) (finding
the reasonableness standard is fulfilled if the interpretation does not “frustrate” the statute’s
objective). Appellate courts also interpret reasonableness to be a deferential standard. See,
e.g., Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017);
Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
96. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416.
97. Like under Chevron, if an agency fails at step one or two, the agency’s position could
still be granted deference under Skidmore. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567
U.S. 142, 159 (2012).
98. See, e.g., Glob. Tel*Link v. FCC, 859 F.3d 39, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Silberman, J.,
concurring). Judge Laurence Silberman provided an example of how the zone of ambiguity
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In sum, Kisor ushered in a new strict standard for when agencies seek
deference for their interpretations of seemingly ambiguous regulations.
Now, courts must determine whether the agency has taken appropriate steps
to qualify for Auer deference, whether the regulation is genuinely ambiguous,
and whether the agency has attempted to interpret the regulation beyond the
zones of ambiguity defined by the courts. However, as will be discussed
more extensively in Part III, the strict deference standard outlined in Kisor is
more than an update or a replacement for Auer deference. By crafting a new
standard that includes aspects of Skidmore and Chevron, Kisor’s strict
deference is a unitary deference doctrine that can be applied in any deference
context99 and one that makes it more difficult for agencies to receive
deference.100 Accordingly, strict deference may address the criticisms levied
at Auer and deference to agencies in general.101
II. THE KISOR DEBATE OVER AUER AND DEFERENCE
Although ultimately deciding to preserve the doctrine, the Court in Kisor
vigorously debated the viability of Auer and, by extension, deference as a
whole.102 In forceful opposition, Justice Gorsuch argued that Justice Kagan
engaged in judicial gymnastics to skirt the fact that Auer, even after being
updated in Kisor, still violated the Administrative Procedure Act103 (APA)
and constitutional separation of powers, as well as failed to address an
agency’s perverse incentives to promulgate vague regulations.104 Justice
Gorsuch contended that Kisor now requires courts to conduct three
complicated, inexact levels of analysis to determine whether an agency’s
interpretation of a regulation is persuasive.105 At best, Justice Gorsuch
opined that this new framework was a reformulation of Skidmore.106

limits the amount of deference an agency could receive. He noted that the issue in Chevron
was the Environmental Protection Agency’s definition of stationary sources of pollution,
which could reasonably mean a whole factory or a single smokestack emitting pollution. See
id. Ruling that “stationary sources” is generally ambiguous, without limiting the ambiguity in
any way, would mean that the agency could receive deference for defining stationary sources
as a whole city, an apartment building, or something else so long as it was not inconsistent
with the statute. See id. Finding a narrow zone of ambiguity, after conducting a rigorous
statutory analysis at step one, would preclude definitions like “whole city,” which are not
inconsistent with the statute but are not really what the statute is meant to regulate.
99. See infra Part III.A.
100. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418 (finding that based on the standard in Kisor, deference to
agencies “often doesn’t” apply).
101. See infra Part II (explaining the benefits and shortcomings of granting deference to
agencies); see also infra Part III.C (explaining how strict deference can address criticisms of
deference).
102. Compare Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2408–24 (plurality opinion), with id. at 2425–28
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
103. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
The APA regulates both the procedures that agencies must follow when promulgating rules
and the scope of judicial oversight to review agency decisions. See id.
104. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425–48 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
105. See id. at 2447.
106. See id.
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This Part explains the debate between the pro-Auer and anti-Auer
deference positions. Part II.A outlines the pro-Auer position. Specifically,
Part II.A.1 explains that Congress intends for agencies to receive deference
because they maintain particular expertise that places them in the best
position to make an interpretive determination related to administering their
regulatory schemes. Part II.A.2 illustrates how this delegation of interpretive
authority to agencies is consonant with constitutional principles and existing
congressional statutes. Part II.B describes the anti-Auer position. Part II.B.1
addresses concerns that Auer deference violates the APA. Further, Part II.B.2
explains why Auer may violate fundamental separation of powers principles,
and Part II.B.3 challenges the presumption held by the pro-Auer position that
agencies are in a better position than courts to decide interpretive questions.
Through drawing the distinctions between these two positions, this Part also
highlights issues related to the larger deference debate. These issues include
whether Congress actually intends for agencies to make interpretive
decisions, whether agencies are best positioned to make interpretive
decisions, and whether deference allows the judiciary to retain its
adjudicatory functions.
A. For Deference: Kisor’s Pro-Auer Position
The pro-Auer position posits that the Auer doctrine “retains an important
role in construing agency regulations.”107 The doctrine allows Congress to
delegate interpretive authority to an agency, which may be more
knowledgeable and experienced than either Congress or the courts on a
particular issue, putting the agency in the best position to interpret a rule.108
This position also argues that such delegation is consistent with constitutional
principles and does not result in a violation of the APA.109
1. Delegating Interpretive Authority to Agencies
Often, regulations are ambiguous.110 However, Congress, despite
knowing about these ambiguities, rarely explicitly assigns interpretive
authority to either an agency or a court.111 Deferring to an agency’s
interpretation of a regulation is one way to address these ambiguities and is
based on a presumption that Congress generally intends for an agency to be
the primary interpreter of ambiguous regulations.112 The presumption favors
agencies, instead of courts, as interpreters for three reasons.
107. Id. at 2408 (plurality opinion).
108. See infra Part II.A.1.
109. See infra Part II.A.2.
110. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2410.
111. See id. at 2412.
112. See id. (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151–
53 (1991)). Under Chevron, the presumption is that when Congress leaves an ambiguity in a
statute, “there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843–44 (1984). If the statute is unambiguous, it is left to the courts to interpret the statute’s
meaning. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 621 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring
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First, agencies, as the original authors of regulations, are in the best
position to determine the regulations’ original meaning.113 This is because
the agency will have “direct insight” into what the rule should mean.114 Even
when faced with an issue it failed to consider during the rulemaking process,
the agency is at least in the best position to explain the regulation’s original
purpose and how that purpose covers the unanticipated issue.115 As Matthew
Stephenson and Miri Pogoriler explained, “the agency’s current view is
likely to accurately capture the agency’s original intent or understanding of
the regulation’s text at the moment of enactment.”116
Second, courts presume that Congress intends to extend deference to
agencies because interpreting ambiguous regulations often implicates policy,
an issue the executive branch traditionally handles.117 Ambiguous
regulations and statutes hold multiple reasonable meanings and choosing
among those meanings is a policy choice.118 For example, Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) regulations prohibit carrying water in a
container larger than 3.4 ounces through airport security,119 but it is not clear
that the prohibition of liquids extends to items like yogurt or tapenade.120
Effectively resolving this policy question requires intimate familiarity with
and expertise on the issue of liquids in the aviation security context.121
Agencies like the TSA are designed specifically to address these types of
problems.122 Justice Kagan argued that Congress is aware that an agency’s

in part and dissenting in part). Depending on the specificity with which it writes laws,
Congress can constrict or enlarge agency discretion as it deems necessary. See City of
Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013); see also Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases
of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 536–37 (2014) (stating that Congress intends for agencies
to fill gaps in statutory schemes).
113. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412. Justice Kagan analogized this assumption to an attempt
to determine the original meaning of an email. See id. Whether looking for the original
meaning of an email or a regulation, Justice Kagan posited one should ask its author. See id.
Justice Gorsuch, however, found this analogy unpersuasive. See id. at 2441 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring). He argued that agency personnel change or an agency’s policy priorities may
shift over time, which means the agency may not know what the original meaning of the
regulation was. See id. This presumption requires the current owner of an email account to
know what a previous owner meant, even when the email was sent decades ago. See id.
114. Id. at 2412 (plurality opinion) (citing Mullins Coal Co. of Va. v. Dir., Office of
Workers’ Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 159 (1987)).
115. See id.
116. Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1449, 1454 (2011).
117. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2413; see also Manning, supra note 10, at 626.
118. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018).
119. See Liquids Rule, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/travel/securityscreening/liquids-rule [https://perma.cc/DQ58-XGUD] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
120. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2413.
121. See id. at 2410 (stating that determining the definition of line of sight at a sporting
event, whether x-ray results are diagnoses, and what an active moiety is are other examples of
policy decisions best left to agencies).
122. See SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1364 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225 (2002) (finding that in the Chevron context
agencies have the expertise and experience to administer detailed, complex statutory
schemes)).
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expertise gives it a comparative advantage over a court.123 Congress
delegates power to the agency, then, so it can use this skill set to complete
the regulatory or statutory scheme as it deems necessary to address new
circumstances implicating the regulation.124
Third, having agencies interpret their own ambiguous regulations
promotes uniformity in the enforcement of the regulation.125 Congress has a
“preference for resolving interpretive issues by uniform administrative
decision, rather than piecemeal by litigation.”126 An agency is able to offer
one interpretation, uniformly applied to all regulated parties.127 By contrast,
a judicial interpretation applies only to those regulated parties located in the
court’s jurisdiction.128 This can lead to disagreements among circuits as to
how a regulation should be enforced.129 The uniformity principle
encompasses simple schemes as well. Even seemingly accessible regulatory
language may have multiple reasonable interpretations.130 Accordingly,
delegating interpretive authority to the agency helps avoid conflicting
interpretations.131
2. Compliance with the APA
The pro-Auer position also argues that the doctrine does not violate any
ratified congressional statute. Specifically, Auer is consistent with
requirements found in sections 553 and 706 of the APA.132 Section 706
provides that it is the courts, not the agency, which “shall decide all relevant
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”133
However, section 706 does not enumerate how a court must find the meaning

123. See id. at 1358 (majority opinion) (finding that policy arguments are not best decided
by the Court).
124. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2413.
125. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093, 1117–29 (1987). Chevron can also offer interpretive uniformity. As Justice Antonin
Scalia noted, the presumptions supporting Chevron create a “stable background . . . against
which Congress can legislate.” City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013).
126. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2413 (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S.
555, 568 (1980)).
127. See id. at 2414.
128. Compare Auer v. Robbins, 65 F.3d 702 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding salaried workers
exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) so long as they experience no deduction
from their compensation), with Yourman v. Dinkins, 84 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam)
(finding salaried workers protected by the FLSA so long as their compensation is subject to
deduction).
129. Compare Auer, 65 F.3d at 710–11, with Yourman, 84 F.3d at 656.
130. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414.
131. See id.; see also Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of
California Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1204 (1995).
132. See Brief of Administrative Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance
at 9–31, Kisor, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (No. 18-15) [hereinafter Brief of Administrative Law
Scholars].
133. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).
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of a rule.134 By conducting an Auer review, the court either finds and then
enforces the statute or regulation’s particular meaning or finds that the
meaning of the regulation is ambiguous.135 In both cases, the court
determines the meaning of the statute or regulation.136 The pro-Auer position
argues this is perfectly consistent with the text of the APA.137
Further, the pro-Auer position contends that the doctrine does not violate
the APA’s required processes for promulgating new rules. The procedures
and requirements imposed on agencies when they engage in rulemaking are
codified in sections 551 through 559 of the APA.138 Section 553 requires
agencies to undergo notice and comment procedures when promulgating
rules with the force of law139 through informal rulemaking.140 To comply,
an agency must present the public with information regarding the proposed
rule, allow the public to comment on the proposed rule, and eventually
provide an explanation for the agency’s decision to adopt or reject the
proposed rule.141 Agencies also have the ability to promulgate rules, albeit
without the force of law, through other methods like issuing an interpretive
rule.142 Auer applies equally to rules with or without the force of law, which
the anti-Auer position argues ostensibly makes non–force of law rules into
force of law rules.143 However, a rule that receives deference is not conferred
with the force of law.144 Agencies then have no incentive to attempt to evade
rulemaking.145 Accordingly, Justice Kagan argues Auer is consistent with
the rulemaking requirements prescribed by the APA.146
In sum, the pro-Auer position advocates for Auer deference based on the
presumption that Congress intends for agencies to have the authority to
interpret their own ambiguous regulations. As agencies write regulations,
they are in the best position to know what the regulations mean. Agencies
also hold the necessary technical and scientific knowledge to interpret
complex regulatory schemes and address the associated policy issues.
Delegating interpretive power to agencies promotes the uniform application

134. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2419.
135. See id. (citing Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of
Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 308 (2017)).
136. See id.
137. But see infra Part II.B.1 (explaining the counterargument that finding a regulation to
be ambiguous is not the same as determining the statute’s meaning).
138. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559.
139. A rule has the force of law “only if Congress has delegated legislative power to the
agency and if the agency intended to exercise that power in promulgating the rule.” Am.
Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
140. 5 U.S.C. § 553; see also United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249–
52 (2d Cir. 1977).
141. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
142. Interpretive rules are pronouncements that inform the public how an agency will
construe and administer a particular statute or regulation. See Azar v. Allina Health Servs.,
139 S Ct. 1804, 1811 (2019). Interpretive rules do not have the force of law. See id.
143. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2420 (2019); see also infra Part II.B.1.
144. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1208 & n.4 (2015).
145. But see infra Parts II.B.1–2.
146. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418–22.
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of regulations and statutes. Further, the pro-Auer position argues that the
doctrine complies with requirements enumerated in the APA. Meeting the
requirements in section 706, courts granting Auer deference are endeavoring
to find the meaning of a rule. If that meaning is unambiguous, the courts will
decide the ultimate outcome, but if it is ambiguous, the ultimate outcome will
be left to the agency for the policy reasons discussed above.147 Finally, Auer
does not circumvent the APA’s rulemaking requirements because it does not
give agencies a method to promulgate force of law rules without the agency
conducting a notice and comment period.
B. Against Deference: Kisor’s Anti-Auer Position
By contrast, the anti-Auer position contends that the doctrine allows
agencies to effectively promulgate force of law regulations without adhering
to the requirements in section 553 and forces judges to abdicate their
responsibilities in violation of section 706.148 Further, the anti-Auer position
argues that Auer violates separation of powers principles because it allows
agencies to have control over all portions of the lawmaking process.149
Accordingly, the anti-Auer position argues that the doctrine should have been
overturned.150
1. Violating the APA
Critics of Auer contend that it violates section 706. Justice Gorsuch argues
that the provision “requires” a court to determine “for itself” the proper
meaning of an agency regulation.151 This is an “unqualified command” from
Congress that courts, not agencies, have interpretive authority.152 When a
court finds a regulation is ambiguous, it is not “‘decid[ing]’ the relevant
‘questio[n] of law’”; it is transferring its judicial functions to the agency in
violation of section 706.153 This position stands in stark contrast to Auer’s
proposition that it is the agency, not the courts, that has the nearly controlling
power to interpret agency regulations so long as that interpretation is not
plainly erroneous.154
Likewise, Auer presents problems given an agency’s obligations under
section 553. The anti-Auer position asserts that, regardless of whether the
147. See supra Part II.A.1.
148. See infra Part II.B.1.
149. See infra Part II.B.2.
150. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 2432.
152. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1) (2018)).
153. Id. A similar argument about judicial abdication can be made about the role of the
judiciary at Chevron step two. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151–52 (10th
Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[R]ather than completing the task expressly assigned to
[judges], . . . declaring what the law is, and overturning inconsistent agency action, Chevron
step two tells us we must allow an executive agency to resolve the meaning of any ambiguous
statutory provision.”).
154. Brief for Professor Thomas Merrill as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 3, Kisor,
139 S. Ct. 2400 (No. 18-15) [hereinafter Brief for Professor Thomas Merrill].
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rule was promulgated through notice and comment, an agency can present an
interpretation of a preexisting vague regulation that “for all practical
purpose” will have binding legal force.155 Because courts can grant
deference for any type of agency rule, Auer disincentivizes agencies to
promulgate rules through notice and comment.156 In Justice Gorsuch’s
opinion, “Auer thus obliterates a distinction Congress thought vital” between
rules carrying the force of law and those not “and supplies agencies with a
shortcut around the APA’s required procedures for issuing and amending
substantive rules that bind the public with the full force and effect of law.”157
2. Violating Separation of Powers
The principle of separation of powers ensures that rule writing, rule
interpretation, and rule enforcement are housed in separate branches of
government so each branch can serve as a check on one another.158 In the
Auer context, the agency has promulgated a rule—a legislative function—
and later, for the same rule, can authoritatively interpret or enforce it—a
judicial function.159 According to the anti-Auer position, unifying these
distinct functions together in one agency “contravenes one of the great rules
of separation of powers: He who writes a law must not adjudge its
violation.”160 Because agencies have the ability to both pass rules and later
interpret them, agencies are incentivized to strategically promulgate vague
and broad regulations.161 If the regulation is vague, an agency can change
the meaning of the regulation whenever it pleases for whatever reason it
wants by issuing a new interpretation of the regulation.162 Because the
agency’s interpretation will only be overturned under Auer if it is plainly
155. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2434 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Perez v. Mortg. Bankers
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1221 (2015)).
156. See Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Anti-parroting Canon, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 290,
308–09 (2011).
157. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2434 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
158. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1984).
159. See Manning, supra note 10, at 631.
160. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 621 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). This separation of powers concern also exists for Chevron
deference. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151–52 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
161. See Manning, supra note 10, at 618.
162. See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Supporters of Auer note that agencies have incentives to promulgate clear rules.
See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2421; see also Brief of Administrative Law Scholars, supra note 132,
at 3–4. Clear rules can lower enforcement costs, ensure better compliance by regulated parties,
and bind subsequent administrations. See Manning, supra note 10, at 655–56. Further, there
is no evidence that agencies take strategic steps to promulgate vague regulations. See Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 308
(2017). In response, the anti-Auer position argues that regardless of whether agencies
strategically promulgate vague regulations, giving them the opportunity to do so by combining
rule writing and interpretation authority in one body necessarily contravenes the Constitution.
See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2440–41 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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erroneous, there is very little risk of the judiciary denying deference and
interpreting an agency’s regulation in a way that conflicts with the agency’s
preference for future interpretation.163
Moreover, allowing an agency “to do what it pleases,”164 or change the
meaning of a regulation, can adversely impact regulated communities.
Without the regulator clearly outlining its rules and expectations, regulated
parties are less likely to understand or realize when they have violated a
regulation.165 This can lead to issues of notice and may ultimately implicate
due process concerns.166
Finally, Auer allows agencies to avoid the costs associated with
promulgating a new regulation. Generally, agencies face a “pay me now or
pay me later” incentive structure.167 When promulgating a rule with the force
of law, the agency incurs upfront costs for going through the notice and
comment period.168 When the agency uses an interpretive rule, which
requires no notice and comment period and therefore incurs no costs ex ante,
the agency risks paying costs later when a regulated entity challenges the rule
and a court reviews it under Skidmore.169 Auer, by contrast, offers agencies
a third, low-cost option; instead of formally amending or overturning existing
rules, agencies can simply say the preexisting regulation means something
totally new.170
3. Rejecting Policy Arguments
In addition to statutory and constitutional concerns, the anti-Auer position
does not subscribe to the presumption that Congress intends for agencies to
have interpretive power. First, the anti-Auer position argues that Congress,
through section 706, chose courts over agencies to determine the meaning of
a regulation.171 To find that the presumption favors agencies, in Justice
Gorsuch’s opinion, would be to believe that “Congress really, secretly,
wanted courts to treat agency interpretations as binding” despite the “plainly
expressed statutory directives” in the APA.172
163.
164.
165.
166.

See Manning, supra note 10, at 655.
Talk Am., 564 U.S. at 69.
See Manning, supra note 10, at 655.
See Ronald A. Cass, Auer Deference: Doubling Down on Delegation’s Defects, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 531, 559–60 (2019).
167. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 116, at 1464.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. Professor Thomas Merrill describes this option as the “pay me never” option. Brief
for Professor Thomas Merrill, supra note 154, at 19; see also Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra
note 116, at 1468–69. This problem is particularly important as agencies can choose the way
in which they promulgate rules. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947). With
this shortcut present, there is nothing binding the agency to a notice and comment process.
See Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 GEO. L.J. 943, 948 (2017) (arguing that
Auer and Chenery are substitutes for each other and used by agencies interested in retaining
future flexibility).
171. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2432 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
172. See id. at 2435. It is also not clear Congress is even secretly delegating authority to
the agencies. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
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Further, the anti-Auer position rejects the presumption that an agency is in
the best position to discern the meaning of a regulation because it is the
original author.173 Agency personnel change over time.174 With such
turnover, the anti-Auer position argues that the agency often cannot know a
regulation’s original meaning.175 Even allowing for institutional knowledge,
an agency’s priorities change as presidential administrations change.176 Auer
allows agencies to modify their interpretations to match an incumbent
president’s position.177 Deferring to an agency’s interpretation, therefore,
cannot guarantee a regulation’s initial meaning will be enforced.
Finally, the anti-Auer position contends that an agency should not receive
deference for being an expert on a particular issue. Expertise can be afforded
“respect” and is often useful to a reviewing court when it makes a decision.178
However, the anti-Auer position argues that expertise does not place agencies
in a position so favorable that they should be granted interpretive power over
courts.179 Instead, agencies should use their expertise as one factor among
many to persuade a court to adopt the agency’s interpretation.180
Justice Gorsuch argued in Kisor that “[o]verruling Auer would have taken
us directly back to Skidmore, liberating courts to decide cases based on their
independent judgment and ‘follow [the] agency’s [view] only to the extent it
is persuasive.’”181 This would have done principally two things. First, courts
would retain the power to be the ultimate arbiters of the meanings of
ambiguous regulations, consistent with the language in section 706.182
Second, were the interpretive function moved primarily back to the courts,
agencies would be concerned with only the executive functions of
rulemaking, removing incentives to promulgate vague regulations and avoid
notice and comment.183 Such a divide would be more consistent with

Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegations, and the Canons (pt. 1),
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 906–07 (2013). Gluck and Bressman found that drafters of legislation
may be aware of some interpretive tools like Chevron and some textual canons like noscitur a
sociis, although the canons are not always applied by drafters as courts expect. See id.
However, there are “a host of canons” and doctrines of which drafters are unaware or that they
ignore. Id. at 907. Similarly, Judge Raymond Kethledge stated that the Office of Legislative
Counsel, the congressional body responsible for writing laws, chooses words “based upon the
sole criterion of clarity.” Kethledge, supra note 89, at 320. If this is true, Judge Kethledge’s
contention supports the anti-Auer position that section 706 clearly assigns interpretive
functions to the judiciary. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
174. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2441 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 2443.
178. See id.
179. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & Elizabeth H. Slattery, The World After Seminole Rock and
Auer, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 625, 646–48 (2019).
180. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2447 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
181. See id. (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269 (2006)).
182. See supra Part II.B.1.
183. See supra Part II.B.2.
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foundational principles of separation of powers.184 Accordingly, the antiAuer position advocated for Auer to be overturned.185
III. A UNITARY THEORY OF DEFERENCE
Kisor could be viewed as an isolated debate over a particular, narrow issue:
whether to maintain Auer or overturn it altogether.186 Kisor, however, does
more than juxtapose these two arguments in a conversation about which of
these positions is more tenable.187 It implicitly offers a third position with
broader implications. Kisor represents a change from independent deference
doctrines to a singular, unitary deference regime. This new approach to
deference is rigorous, making it more difficult for agencies to receive any
type of deference.188 In effect, the Court has moved from traditional
deference—deferring to an agency when a statute or regulation is textually
ambiguous—to a strict deference standard, which requires courts to consider
more than just the plain words of the statute.189 The test in Kisor is the
Court’s first illustration of this new strict deference standard and, given the
links between the deference doctrines, could signal that soon the Court will
apply the Kisor test in other deference situations, including those scenarios
traditionally analyzed under Chevron.190 No longer would there be Auer
deference or Chevron deference. Instead, there would be one unitary
deference standard: strict deference.
Part III.A explains how in Kisor the Court combined Chevron, Skidmore,
and Auer into a unitary deference doctrine, which this Note calls strict
deference.191 Next, Part III.B applies strict deference to three Chevron cases
decided by circuit courts and the Supreme Court. The case studies explain
each court’s original analysis under the traditional Chevron framework and
then demonstrate how the analysis would change if strict deference had been
applied. Finally, Part III.C argues that strict deference ameliorates some of
the concerns expressed by the antideference position outlined in Part II.B,
while still preserving the benefits outlined in Part II.A. It then argues that
strict deference can work as a unitary deference doctrine.

184. See Manning, supra note 10, at 631.
185. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
186. See supra Part II.
187. But see Corbin K. Barthold & Cory L. Andrews, Symposium: A Small Win for James
Kisor; a Big Loss for the Constitution, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2019, 2:19 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/symposium-a-small-win-for-james-kisor-a-big-lossfor-the-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/9QUT-VBJ8] (positing that the fight about Auer is
over).
188. See supra Part I.B.
189. See supra Part I.A.2.
190. See supra Part I.A.2.
191. See supra Part II.B.
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A. Strict Deference as a Unitary Standard
Instead of viewing each of its deference doctrines in silos,192 to be
deployed independently, Kisor suggests that the Court is moving towards a
unified doctrine of deference in which Chevron, Auer, and Skidmore are
inextricably linked.193 Indeed, in his Kisor concurrence, Chief Justice
Roberts noted that “cases in which Auer deference is warranted largely
overlap with the cases in which it would be unreasonable for a court not to
be persuaded by an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation,” a Skidmore
principle.194 Courts have also acknowledged the links between Chevron and
Auer. In Auer itself, Justice Antonin Scalia cited Chevron for the proposition
that the secretary of labor’s interpretation of “salaried” deserved
deference.195 He later wrote that “[in] practice, Auer deference is Chevron
deference applied to regulations rather than statutes”196 and that “[Auer]
seems to be a natural corollary—indeed, an a fortiori application—of
[Chevron’s] rule that we will defer to an agency’s interpretation of the statute
it is charged with implementing.”197 Similarly, Justice Kennedy cited Auer
directly together with United States v. Mead Corp.198 in assessing an
Environmental Protection Agency decision regarding discharge fill material
standards.199 Kristin Hickman and Mark Thomson also recognized the
similarities at play, referring to Chevron as Auer’s “close cousin.”200

192. This siloed approach, applied only to the Chevron context, has been referred to as the
decision tree model. See Hickman, supra note 112, at 537–41.
193. Compare United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (linking Chevron
and Skidmore by finding that an agency decision denied deference under Chevron could still
be upheld under Skidmore), and Hickman, supra note 112, at 544 (writing that the Court has
employed a “blended approach” to some Chevron cases), with Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct.
2400, 2414 (2019) (linking Auer with Skidmore and finding that an agency decision denied
deference under Auer could still be upheld under Skidmore). Aditya Bamzai believes Auer
and Skidmore are virtually identical and questions whether employing different types of
deference makes sense. Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy,
Kisor, and the Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164, 192
(2019). At least in the context of Auer and Skidmore, Bamzai writes, “it might make sense to
have a single approach with a single label.” Id.
194. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
195. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457 (1997). Lower courts have also
acknowledged that a “similar standard [to Chevron] is applied in judicial review of an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations.” Indep. Petroleum Ass’n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92
F.3d 1248, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Forrest Gen. Hosp. v. Azar, 926 F.3d 221, 230 (5th
Cir. 2019) (finding that “[i]n practice, Auer deference mirrors Chevron deference”).
196. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 617 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
197. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Despite pointing out the similarities, Justice Scalia used his concurrences in Talk America and
Northwest Environmental to harshly criticize Auer for shortcomings discussed in Part II.B.
See id. at 68–69; Nw. Envtl., 568 U.S. at 616–21 (Scalia, J., concurring).
198. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
199. See Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 277–78
(2009) (first citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 234–38; then citing Auer, 519 U.S. at 461).
200. Kristin E. Hickman & Mark. R. Thomson, The Chevronization of Auer, 103 MINN. L.
REV. HEADNOTES 103, 107 (2019).
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This larger unitary deference regime looks like a double helix of DNA.
Auer and Chevron serve as the rails of the helix, while Skidmore, like the
proteins in DNA, binds the doctrines together. And just as the rails of DNA
are comprised of the same chemical compounds, Chevron and Auer can also
be viewed as comprising the same analytical elements.201 More importantly,
a unified strict deference standard makes it possible for the Court to apply
this standard in contexts beyond Auer. Limiting application of the standard
to the Auer context would accentuate a contradiction. A stricter test resulting
in less deference would be applied when an agency interprets regulations it
promulgated, but a more relaxed test would be applied when an agency
interprets statutes passed by Congress.202 Therefore, strict deference is
unlikely to remain an Auer-specific test. The logical next step, especially
given how the Court has already linked together the deference standards into
a unitary regime, would be to apply the same strict deference standard to
Chevron.203 Indeed, the Court’s attention has turned in that direction. Justice
Kennedy wrote that, “[g]iven the concerns raised by some Members of this
Court, it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate
case, the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented
that decision.”204
B. Case Studies
This section applies the strict deference standard to three cases, two
decided at the circuit court level and one decided at the Supreme Court,
which analyzed deference under a Chevron framework. Part III.B.1 applies
strict deference to a case where the Ninth Circuit granted reflexive deference,
choosing only to look at the plain meaning of the text. Part III.B.2 illustrates
201. See supra Parts I.A.2, I.B (showing that both doctrines include a threshold
requirement, a statutory interpretation requirement, and a reasonableness requirement). Some
courts have applied all three doctrines in a single case to determine if an agency should receive
deference. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255–75 (2006); Belt v. P.F. Chang’s
China Bistro, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 3d 512, 528–30 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
202. See Nw. Envtl., 568 U.S. at 617–18 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
203. See supra Part I.A.2 (explaining limits being placed on Chevron).
204. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(internal citations omitted); see also supra Part I.A.2. Even in agency cases that do not involve
deference, the Court is conducting discerning interpretive reviews of statutes. See Gundy v.
United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019) (confirming that delegation to the agency to
enforce sex offender laws did not violate constitutional principles of nondelegation); see also
Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting the
denial of certiorari) (calling for reconsideration of when Congress can delegate interpretive
authority to agencies). Kisor also contains clues that the Court may be turning its attention to
Chevron. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(“Issues surrounding judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations are
distinct from those raised in connection with judicial deference to agency interpretations of
statutes enacted by Congress. I do not regard the Court’s decision today to touch upon the
latter question.” (citations omitted)); see also Brief of Professors of Administrative Law and
Federal Regulation as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 3, Kisor, 139 S. Ct. 2400
(No. 18-15) (arguing that regardless of whether Auer and Seminole Rock are overturned or
narrowed, Chevron is and should remain good law).
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how, even when a court conducts a more robust Chevron analysis, strict
deference can favor courts’ retention of interpretive authority. Part III.B.3
tracks a Chevron analysis at the Supreme Court and shows how deference is
still available to agencies even when they are subjected to a strict deference
review.
1. Baldwin v. United States
In 2007, Howard and Karen Baldwin believed that a $2.5 million net
operating loss from their movie production business could be used to offset
tax liability for the 2005 tax year.205 Based on that offset, the Baldwins filed
for a tax refund of approximately $167,000.206 To be considered for the
refund, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations required them to file by
October 15, 2011.207 The Baldwins claimed that they sent the form to the
IRS in June 2011; however, the IRS allegedly never received it.208 By the
time the Baldwins re-sent the filing and confirmed the agency received it, the
statutory deadline had passed and the IRS denied the Baldwins’ claim as
untimely.209
The Baldwins then brought suit in federal court. Taxpayers can bring a
civil action to recover any IRS tax that has been “erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected”210 but only after they properly file for a refund or credit
with the IRS.211 A properly filed refund or credit is one that is filed within
the statutory limits articulated by law—here, by October 15, 2011.212
Before 1954, a document was filed properly if it was physically delivered
to the IRS.213 To protect taxpayers from mistakes made by the United States
Postal Service (USPS) when delivering these documents, some jurisdictions
applied the common-law mailbox rule.214 This rule allowed an individual to
present evidence showing that the mailing was physically delivered in a
reasonable amount of time.215 The Baldwins relied on the mailbox rule in
bringing their case.216

205. See Baldwin v. United States, 921 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 2019).
206. Id.
207. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6511(b)(1), (d)(2)(A)).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2018).
211. See Baldwin, 921 F.3d at 839 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a)).
212. See id. (citing Yuen v. United States, 825 F.2d 244, 245 (9th Cir. 1987)).
213. Id. at 839–40.
214. Id. at 840. The mailbox rule states that “proof of proper mailing—including by
testimonial or circumstantial evidence—gives rise to the rebuttable presumption that the
document was physically delivered to the addressee in the time such a mailing would
ordinarily take to arrive.” Phila. Marine Trade Ass’n v. Comm’r, 523 F.3d 140, 147 (3d Cir.
2008).
215. See Baldwin, 921 F.3d at 840 (first citing Detroit Auto. Prods. Corp. v. Comm’r, 203
F.2d 785, 785–86 (6th Cir. 1953) (per curiam); then citing Ark. Motor Coaches, Ltd v.
Comm’r, 198 F.2d 189, 191 (8th Cir. 1952)).
216. See id. at 842.
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In 1954, Congress codified exceptions to the physical delivery rule,
satisfied when the IRS actually receives the filing on time, by promulgating
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 7502.217 Pursuant to the statute, a
document is considered filed if the IRS actually received it and it was
postmarked before the deadline date.218 A filing sent by certified mail
automatically met these two requirements.219 In 1992, the Ninth Circuit
found that, despite codifying the certified mail exception, section 7502 did
not replace the common-law mailbox rule but instead supplemented it.220
Other circuits, however, found that section 7502 replaced the mailbox rule
completely.221
In 2011, the Treasury Department attempted to resolve this disagreement
among the courts by amending 26 C.F.R. § 301.7502-1(e).222 The regulation
stated that the exception in section 7502 replaced the mailbox rule.223 The
district court rejected the Treasury Department’s argument that the new
amended regulation could bar the application of the mailbox rule.224 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit asked whether the district court was correct in
rejecting the government’s argument.225
a. Applying Chevron
The court reviewed section 7502 under Chevron to determine whether the
statute barred the application of the mailbox rule.226 At step one, the court
found that section 7502 was “silent” as to whether the statute replaced the
common-law rule.227 The court noted that section 7502 explicitly provides
exceptions, including for certified mail and electronic filings, but does not
provide an exception for regular mail.228 At step two, the court found that
the agency’s interpretation of the statute was permissible.229 The court
opined that the statute presented two reasonable constructions of section
7502, including the agency’s interpretation that the statute precluded the
mailbox rule.230 The court presumed that “where Congress explicitly
enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions
are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative

217. See id. at 840.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 840–41 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1)).
220. Anderson v. United States, 966 F.2d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 1992).
221. See Baldwin, 921 F.3d at 841 (first citing Miller v. United States, 784 F.2d 728, 730–
31 (6th Cir. 1986); then citing Deutsch v. Comm’r, 599 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1979)).
222. See id.
223. Id. at 841–42.
224. See id. at 842.
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. Id. at 843.
230. See id.
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intent.”231 As the statute enumerates an exception for certified mail only, but
does not speak with such clarity regarding the mailbox rule, the court found
the Treasury Department’s interpretation reasonable.232 Accordingly, the
court granted deference.233
b. Applying Strict Deference
In granting deference, the Ninth Circuit conducted the type of basic
Chevron analysis that has led commentators to question whether the doctrine
needs updating.234 Had the court applied the more rigorous strict deference
standard, however, the agency may not have received Chevron deference.
i. Character and Context Requirements
Step one of the strict deference standard requires a court to assess whether
deference is appropriate.235 The Treasury Department’s interpretation raises
two issues. First, strict deference requires a court to consider whether an
agency used its experience and knowledge to make its interpretation.236 In
this case, the Treasury Department may not have leveraged its substantive
expertise as the chief revenue agency when interpreting section 7502. This
provision provides a remedy to taxpayers when the IRS receives their filings
late or not at all due to a mistake by the USPS.237 Arguably, the Treasury
Department’s substantive knowledge about revenue is not necessary to
interpret section 7502’s provisions about the mail system. Accordingly, the
court may be as qualified as the Treasury Department to determine the
meaning of the statute.
Second, the agency’s interpretation gives rise to notice issues, suggesting
that the Treasury Department did not use fair and reasoned judgment in
making its interpretation.238 The Baldwins could not have known that the
mailbox rule would be inapplicable; they attempted to secure a refund from
the IRS as early as June 2011, two months before the Treasury Department
promulgated its amended regulation barring the mailbox rule.239 The court
found notice not to be at issue.240 It noted that the regulation is explicitly
written to be backward-looking, covering all documents mailed after
September 21, 2004.241 This retroactive provision is in compliance with IRC
231. Id. (quoting Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. 483, 496 (2013)). But see infra Part
III.B.1.b.ii. (explaining that Senate and House committee reports may demonstrate legislative
intent contrary to the explicit enumerated exceptions in the statute).
232. See Baldwin, 921 F.3d at 843.
233. Id. at 844.
234. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Walker, supra note 46.
235. See supra Part I.B.
236. See supra Part I.B.
237. See Baldwin, 921 F.3d at 839–40.
238. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
239. See Baldwin, 921 F.3d at 839.
240. Id. at 844.
241. Id.
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section 7805(b), which “authorizes the Treasury Secretary to make
regulations retroactively applicable as far back as the date of their
proposal.”242 While the regulation may have been legally in accordance with
the IRC, the regulation is still backward-looking. Under strict deference,
agencies should not receive deference for this type of retroactive
interpretation.243
ii. The Interpretive Tool Kit
At Chevron step one, the court found that section 7502 was “silent”244 on
whether the statute incorporated the mailbox rule.245 However, in primarily
relying on the plain text, the court did not fully utilize all its tools of statutory
interpretation, including a review of the statute’s legislative history.246
Senate and House committee reports for a 1966 amendment to section 7502
suggest that Congress intended to include the mailbox rule in the statute.247
The reports state that the statute’s purpose was to provide that “where a
claim, statement, or other document, which is required to be filed by a
specific date is properly mailed, the postmarked date is to be considered as
the date on which it was filed.”248 Before promulgating the amended
regulation, the IRS acted in compliance with this purpose, considering filings
and returns timely if they were mailed before the due date, regardless of
whether the mail was certified.249 The reports state that the certified mail
exception is a “special provision” to the statute’s general purpose and
provides taxpayers with a guaranteed way of establishing delivery.250
Based on a fair interpretation of the legislative record, section 7502 offers
individuals two ways to prove delivery. An individual could take advantage
of the special certified mail provision, guaranteeing she establishes her prima
facie case. Alternatively, the statute allows for the common-law mailbox
rule; the individual could present evidence, without any guarantees of
meeting her burden, that the mail was sent before the due date.251 While they
did not present evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case, the
Baldwins presented testimony from two of their employees that the returns
were mailed before the statutory deadline.252 Under this interpretation, the
testimony could fulfill the general requirements of section 7502.

242. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1)(B)).
243. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
244. Baldwin, 921 F.3d at 842.
245. Id.
246. The court does explain the history of the mailbox rule and the statute but does not
address specifically section 7502’s history and purpose. This would be a relevant inquiry as
the statute was meant to address maladies with the physical delivery rule, something the
mailbox rule could fix. See id. at 840.
247. See generally S. REP. NO. 89-1625 (1966); H.R. REP. NO. 89-1915 (1966).
248. S. REP. NO. 89-1625, at 8; H.R. REP. NO. 89-1915, at 8.
249. See supra note 248.
250. Supra note 248.
251. See S. REP. NO. 89-1625, at 9; H.R. REP. NO. 89-1915, at 9.
252. Baldwin v. United States, 921 F.3d 836, 842 (9th Cir. 2019).

2678

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

Had the court deployed more interpretive tools, it may have found that the
statute was not in fact genuinely ambiguous. The legislative history
demonstrates that the statute was not “silent”253 on the mailbox rule and
suggests that the court could have found a meaning with a more searching
review.254 Without the genuine ambiguity, the agency would not be entitled
to deference under strict deference and it would be up to the court to
determine the statute’s meaning.255
iii. Reasonableness
Step three under strict deference flows naturally from the analysis done at
step two. An interpretation is reasonable if it addresses the zone of ambiguity
identified by the court at step two and nothing more. In Baldwin v. United
States,256 the court not did identify such a zone. Instead, the court found that
the entire statute was “silent” on the mailbox rule question.257 The zone of
ambiguity, therefore, was the whole statute. Had the court narrowed the
inquiry to a smaller subsection of the statute at step two, the agency’s
interpretation may have exceeded the zone of ambiguity and deference would
not have been extended. Instead, the court conducted a more traditional
Chevron step two analysis, asking if the interpretation was permissible.258
In sum, the Ninth Circuit conducted a traditional Chevron review that was
highly deferential to the agency. It did not fully consider notice or whether
substantive expertise was used in making its interpretation. Further, the court
did not fully consider legislative history that may have suggested that
Congress did intend for section 7502 to include the mailbox rule. Had the
court analyzed these factors pursuant to strict deference, it is likely that the
court would have denied deference in this case. In any event, subjecting the
agency to a rigorous strict deference analysis would have ameliorated
concerns that this case represented another example of reflexive
deference.259
2. Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives
In response to mass shootings in 2017 and 2018,260 the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) promulgated a rule classifying
bump stocks as machine guns pursuant to the National Firearms Act261 (the
253. Id.
254. See Walker, supra note 46. See generally Kethledge, supra at note 89.
255. See supra Part I.A.1.
256. 921 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 2019).
257. See id. at 842.
258. See id. at 843; see also supra Part I.A.2.
259. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Walker,
supra note 46.
260. See Charlie Savage, Trump Administration Imposes Ban on Bump Stocks, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/trump-bump-stocksban.html [https://perma.cc/2SGR-G6SY].
261. Pub. L. No. 90-618, tit. II, 82 Stat. 1227 (1954) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 and 26 U.S.C.).
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“Firearms Act”).262 Machine guns are regulated under the Firearms Act263
and are defined as “any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be
readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual
reloading, by a single function of the trigger.”264 The Firearms Act also
regulates parts or components intended to convert a firearm into a machine
gun.265
ATF argued that a bump stock fits the statutory requirements enumerated
in section 5845(b) of the Firearms Act.266 To do so, ATF conducted a twostep analysis. First, the agency defined “automatically” as “the result of a
self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that allows the firing of multiple
rounds through a single function of the trigger.”267 Second, the agency
defined a “single function of a trigger” as “a single pull of the trigger and
analogous motions.”268 Accordingly, ATF concluded that machine gun, as
defined in the Firearms Act, included bump stocks because the device
allowed a semiautomatic weapon to discharge more than one cartridge with
a single pull of the trigger.269 By contrast, the plaintiffs argued that the
statutory definition of machine gun does not include a bump stock.270
a. Applying Chevron
After conducting a Chevron review, the court granted deference to ATF.271
At step one, the court focused its analysis on the language of the statute:
“single function of the trigger” and “automatically.”272 It identified two
interpretations for “single function of the trigger.” This phrase could mean
either that the singular mechanical act of pulling the trigger results in the
discharge of only one bullet or the singular mechanical act of pulling the
trigger results in the discharge of multiple bullets because of the bump
The court found nothing to preclude either of these
stock.273
interpretations.274 Accordingly, the court found that there was a statutory
gap for which ATF could offer an interpretation.275

262. See Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 6
(D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 789 (2020).
263. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)).
264. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b)).
265. Id. at 7.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 8 (citing 27 C.F.R. §§ 447.11, 478.11, 479.11).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 6.
271. Id. at 32.
272. See id. at 29.
273. See id.
274. See id. The court considered dictionary definitions of “function” as well as the plain
meaning of the statute in attempting to resolve the possible ambiguities. See id. The court
conducted a similar analysis for “automatically” by considering its dictionary definition and
plain meaning. See id. at 30.
275. Id. at 29.
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Similarly, the court found “automatically” to be ambiguous.276 A function
can be automatic even if there is some limited level of human involvement
in the process.277 The court, however, noted that it is not clear how much
human involvement would push a process from automatic to manual.278 It is
also not clear if a single action, like a single trigger pull, is enough to start an
automatic process.279 Without answers to these questions, the court
determined that there was another statutory gap for ATF to fill.280
At step two, the court found the agency’s interpretations of both “single
function of the trigger” and “automatically” permissible.281 First, the court
found that the agency’s expertise on the mechanics of firearms placed it in a
better position to define “single function of the trigger” than a court.282
Second, the court found that other jurisdictions read the statute consistently
with the agency’s interpretation.283 Third, the court found that an
interpretation of “automatically,” which included some limited amount of
human intervention comported, with an “everyday understanding of the word
‘automatic.’”284 Fourth, the court noted that the statute itself allows for some
human intervention.285 Therefore, the court found ATF’s interpretation
permissible, and it received deference under Chevron.286
b. Applying Strict Deference
The D.C. Circuit conducted a rigorous Chevron analysis that largely
comports with the requirements of strict deference. However, based on the
record, a strict deference review would have leaned toward placing
interpretive authority with the court and counseled against extending
deference.
i. Character and Context Requirements
In line with step one, the court initially addressed whether Chevron was
even applicable.287 The court found that 18 U.S.C. § 926(a) and 26 U.S.C.
§ 7805(a) both expressly delegated rulemaking authority carrying the force
of law to ATF by way of the Department of Justice.288 The court also found
276. Id. at 30.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. Id. at 31.
281. Id.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. Id.
285. See id. at 31–32.
286. Id. at 32. But see Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140
S. Ct. 789 (2020) (denying petition for a writ of certiorari). The third question presented to
the Court was “[w]hether, if Chevron deference applies and cannot be waived, Chevron should
be overruled?” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Guedes, 140 S. Ct. 789 (No. 19-296).
287. See Guedes, 920 F.3d at 19.
288. See id.
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that the bump stock rule was in furtherance of this authority.289 As the
agency met both prongs of the Mead test, ATF’s interpretation qualified for
deference.290
However, to fulfill the character and context requirements, an agency must
show it does more than just meet the basic threshold question.291 Like in
Baldwin, at issue in Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &
Explosives292 was whether the agency exercised its fair and reasoned
judgment in making its interpretation.293 To consider this question, the court
framed its analysis as an arbitrary and capricious review under the hard look
doctrine.294 In doing its hard look analysis, the court addressed at least five
reasons for why the agency’s interpretation could not be considered arbitrary
and capricious.295 The court found that the agency engaged in a cost-benefit
analysis to address reliance concerns and additionally identified no
deficiencies in the notice and comment process that would have led the
agency to reach a decision contrary to the presented evidence.296 Further,
the agency addressed concerns of post hoc rationalization, litigation strategy,
and notice by delaying the start of enforcement ninety days from when the
ATF promulgated the regulation.297 Therefore, the agency’s interpretation
withstood the court’s hard look review.
This analysis suggests that the court fulfilled the character and context
requirements of strict deference. Judge Karen Henderson, in concurrence,
however, pointed out two potential flaws in the majority’s analysis. First,
ATF’s interpretation implicates concerns regarding notice.298 When ATF
originally classified bump stocks, the agency did not classify them as
machine guns.299 In 2006, ATF changed its position, classifying a particular
type of bump stock, an Akins stock, as a machine gun,300 following the
agency’s shift in its interpretation of “single function of the trigger” in section
5845(b) from “single movement of the trigger” to “single pull of the

289. See id.
290. Id. at 20.
291. See supra Part I.B.
292. 920 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 789 (2020).
293. See supra Part III.C.1.b.i. Here, by stating that the agency used its expertise, the court
implicitly considered other factors of the character and context analysis. See Guedes, 920 F.3d
at 31.
294. See Guedes, 920 F.3d at 32 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
295. See id. at 33–34.
296. See id. at 34.
297. See id. at 35.
298. See id. at 37 (Henderson, J., concurring in part); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct.
2400, 2418 (2019) (finding that the Court has “rarely given Auer deference to an agency
construction ‘conflict[ing] with a prior one’” (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512
U.S. 504, 515 (1994))).
299. See Guedes, 920 F.3d at 37 (Henderson, J., concurring in part) (citing Bump-StockType Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 66,514, 66,517 (Dec. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 27 C.F.R. pts.
447, 478, and 479)).
300. Id.
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trigger.”301 Despite this interpretation, ATF continued to use the “single
movement of the trigger” definition when classifying all other non-Akins
bump stocks. Indeed, between 2008 and 2017, ATF issued ten rulings in
which it found that various bump stocks did not qualify as machine guns.302
ATF changed its position again in Guedes, interpreting non-Akins bump
stocks to be machine guns.
This muddied history of defining bump stocks suggests that the agency’s
interpretation in Guedes actually may violate the character and context
requirements of strict deference. Defining non-Akins bump stocks as
machine guns contradicts almost ten years of stable agency decision-making.
Further, given that this rule was promulgated in reaction to horrific mass
shootings,303 it is not unreasonable to wonder if the agency took into account
the regulation’s potential impact on litigation. Under a strict deference
analysis, these factors would counsel against granting an agency deference,
despite the agency’s interpretation withstanding the court’s hard look
analysis.
Second, Judge Henderson argued that courts should not extend Chevron
deference when an agency seeks to interpret a criminal statute.304 If Chevron
does not apply to criminal statutes, it cannot apply to statutes, like the
Firearms Act, which include both civil and criminal liability.305 If Congress
intended for an agency to have such authority, it would make a clear
statement expressly enumerating the delegation, and the regulation would
have to include fair warning to avoid lenity issues.306 Judge Henderson noted
that neither of these requirements were met and, accordingly, the court should
not have granted deference.307
In contrast, the majority distinguished between interpretations of rules
carrying the force of law, which could qualify for Chevron deference, and
interpretations of rules without the force of the law, which could not.308 The
majority found that an agency could not receive deference for interpretations
of criminal statutes made without the force of law, but an agency could
receive deference for interpreting rules that had the force of law, regardless
of whether those rules implicated criminal liability.309 This dispute about
whether Chevron applies in a criminal context goes to the heart of strict
301. See id. This interpretation was upheld in Akins v. United States, 312 F. App’x 197,
201 (11th Cir. 2009).
302. See Guedes, 920 F.3d at 37 (Henderson, J., concurring in part) (citing Bump-StockType Devices, 83 Fed. Reg. 66,514, 66,517 (Dec. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 27 C.F.R. pts.
447, 478, and 479)).
303. See Michael D. Shear, Trump Moves to Regulate “Bump Stock” Devices, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/us/politics/trump-bump-stocks.html
[https://perma.cc/TX6M-QLP4].
304. See Guedes, 920 F.3d at 39–40 (Henderson, J., concurring in part) (citing GutierrezBrizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1156 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)).
305. See id. at 41.
306. See id. at 41–42.
307. See id. at 42.
308. See id. at 24–25 (majority opinion).
309. See id. at 25.
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deference’s first step. The standard ensures that deference is only granted
when it is truly appropriate.310 The fact that there is disagreement over
whether it is appropriate to extend Chevron in this case because of possible
criminal liability, coupled with the notice issues, suggests that in this case
deference may not have been warranted.
ii. The Interpretive Tool Kit
To find that “single function of the trigger” and “automatically” were
ambiguous, the court conducted a textualist analysis of the statute.311
Leveraging both dictionary definitions and the ordinary meanings of the
words, the court found that “single function of the trigger” had two distinct
definitions and “automatically” could hold a number of interpretations.312
The multitude of interpretations for each of the two phrases at issue led the
court to determine that there was sufficient ambiguity for the agency to
interpret the statute.313
At step two, a court must conduct more than just a textual analysis. In this
case, the majority did not consider legislative history,314 the statute’s original
purpose, or the statutes beyond sections 5845(a) and 5845(b). Taking a
purposive approach315 would have led the court to consider the agency’s
previous interpretations that a bump stock did not constitute a machine gun.
It also could have helped the court determine whether one of the definitions
for either “single function of the trigger” or “automatically” was ambiguous
given the entirety of the statute and purpose behind it. Under a strict
deference analysis, finding two possible interpretations is not enough to
decide whether a statute or regulation is genuinely ambiguous.316 It is only
after deploying all interpretive tools that such a determination can be made.
While the majority conducted a careful textualist analysis, it is possible that
applying the strict deference standard would have resulted in the court
finding that the statute was in fact not ambiguous. If so, the court would not
have granted deference.

310. See supra Part I.B.
311. See Guedes, 920 F.3d at 29–31.
312. Id.
313. See supra note 274 and accompanying text; Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd. 566
U.S. 560, 566–69 (2012) (demonstrating that dictionary definitions are a key part of a court’s
statutory analysis). See also generally Lawrence Baum & James J. Brudney, Oasis or Mirage:
The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 483 (2013) (examining how Supreme Court justices use dictionaries in statutory
decisions).
314. The court noted that the agency reviewed congressional reports, but the record does
not suggest that the court itself engaged in a legislative history analysis. To the extent that it
did engage with the legislative history, it was to assess reasonableness, not to assess whether
the statutory language was genuinely ambiguous. See Guedes, 920 F.3d at 31.
315. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 31 (2014).
316. See supra Part I.B.
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iii. Reasonableness
Assuming that the statute was ambiguous, the court properly conducted a
strict deference analysis at step three. Central to this review is determining
whether the agency’s interpretation falls within the zone of ambiguity
identified by the court.317 Here, the majority identified two narrow
ambiguities—in the language of “single function of the trigger” and
“automatically.”318 The agency’s interpretation only addressed these
ambiguities.319 While it would have been possible for the agency to fail at
this late step had its interpretation exceeded the narrow zone of ambiguity
identified by the court, the agency tailored its interpretation to the small gap
in the statute. Accordingly, the agency satisfied strict deference at step three.
In sum, Guedes is a close case. At step one, the agency’s interpretation
survived a multifactor hard look analysis. However, the majority failed to
address the inconsistent interpretive positions the agency has taken in
defining bump stocks, and the issue of applying Chevron to criminal statutes
remains murky. Similarly, the court conducted a careful textual analysis to
determine if the statute was ambiguous but chose not to deploy all the
interpretive tools at its disposal. While the analysis comes close to fulfilling
strict deference, the outstanding concerns would caution against extending
deference in this case if strict deference had been applied.320
3. National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Services
The Communications Act of 1934321 regulates two types of bodies:
telecommunications carriers and information service providers.322
Telecommunications carriers provide “telecommunications services,” which
involve the transmission “between or among points specified by the user, of
information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of
the information as sent and received.”323 The Act requires that providers of
such services comply with mandatory common carrier regulations.324 By
contrast, information service providers offer the “capability [of] generating,
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making
available information via telecommunications.”325 In a March 2002
declaratory ruling, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
concluded that broadband internet service provided by cable companies was
317. See supra Part I.B.
318. Guedes, 920 F.3d at 31.
319. See id.
320. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2418 (2019) (observing that conflicting agency
interpretations and questions implicating notice provide reasons to not extend Auer deference);
id. at 2447 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (same).
321. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–624 (2018).
322. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975 (2005)
(citing 47 U.S.C. § 153(44)).
323. Id. at 977 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(43)).
324. See id.
325. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(20)).
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not a “telecommunications service” subjected to common carrier regulations
because the companies did not “offer” information transmission services.326
The Ninth Circuit found the FCC’s ruling impermissible327 and,
subsequently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.328
a. Applying Chevron
Writing for the majority in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n
v. Brand X Internet Services,329 Justice Thomas stated that the issue facing
the FCC was whether a cable company offered customers a
telecommunications service and an information service bundled together or
whether the cable company provided the services separately.330 If the
company provided services separately, the common carrier regulations
would apply to cable companies.331 The FCC argued that while cable
companies do provide a telecommunications service, the companies’ primary
Therefore,
purpose is to provide information services.332
telecommunications services provided to consumers as a by-product of
providing information services were not regulated by the Act.333
Justice Thomas found that at Chevron step one, the statute was ambiguous.
Beginning with an ordinary meaning analysis, Justice Thomas observed that
the statute had two reasonable constructions.334 The plain meaning of the
statute states that a cable company offers information services and,
separately, in order to deliver those services, offers a data transmission
service.335 However, the statute could also mean that cable companies
provide only information services and that data transmission services are
nothing more than a by-product.336 Given that the offer could reasonably be
the integrated final product or the discrete components, Justice Thomas
found the statute to be ambiguous.337
To reach this second meaning and confirm the ambiguity of the statute,
Justice Thomas turned to the regulatory history surrounding the
Communications Act. First, he noted that the FCC has defined terms based
326. Id. at 977–78.
327. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub
nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
328. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 979–80.
329. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
330. Id. at 976–77.
331. See id. at 990. Justice Thomas offers examples—consumers understand car
dealerships sell cars. But as a by-product of selling the cars, dealerships also sell car engines.
Similarly, a pet store can sell dogs, and it also sells leashes. The difference between the
hypotheticals is how integrated the products—cars and engines or dogs and leashes—are. See
id. at 990–91.
332. See id. at 988.
333. See id.
334. Id. at 989.
335. See id.
336. See id.
337. Id. (“[W]here a statute’s plain terms admit of two or more reasonable ordinary usages,
the Commission’s choice of one of them is entitled to deference.” (quoting Verizon
Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 498 (2002))).
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on how consumers interact with information.338 Because consumers use
information services as an integrated offering, it is reasonable to assume that
“telecommunications services” refers to a “pure” or disintegrated offering.339
Otherwise, all information services could be a telecommunications service
regulated by common carriers rules, rendering the distinction meaningless.
Second, the FCC had “long held” that not all providers of transmission
services, which could include cable companies, are common carriers.340
Congress was aware of this regulatory history when it amended the
Communications Act in 1996, and, therefore, it is reasonable to assume that
Congress incorporated these positions into the terms of the statute.341
At step two, Justice Thomas found that the FCC offered a “reasoned
explanation” for not subjecting cable companies to common carrier
regulations because the agency relied on its technical expertise regarding
how the internet functions.342 In arriving at its interpretation, the FCC
consulted the agency’s commission report, which found that broadband
companies integrated telecommunications and information services.343 This
led the FCC to decide that these cable companies were not offering a discrete
telecommunications service.344 The FCC also concluded that based on
market conditions, broadband cable companies should compete with minimal
regulatory oversight to promote investment and innovation.345 Labeling
these companies as common carriers would frustrate that goal.346 Ultimately,
the majority believed this “technical and complex”347 choice to be the type
of policy decision “Chevron leaves to the [agency] to resolve.”348
Accordingly, the Court granted the FCC deference.349
b. Applying Strict Deference
The analysis done to determine whether the FCC would receive deference
is illustrative of how strict deference would be applied in the Chevron
context. It also demonstrates that an agency can receive deference, even
under this rigorous standard, if it offers a well-reasoned and narrow
interpretation of a genuinely ambiguous statute.

338. See id. at 993.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. See id. at 992–93 (citing Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 159
(1993)).
342. Id. at 1000.
343. See id. at 978.
344. See id.
345. See id. at 1001.
346. See id. at 1001–02.
347. Id. at 992.
348. Id. at 991.
349. See id. at 986.
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i. Character and Context Requirements
The majority’s analysis largely addresses the main components of the
character and context requirements. First, because Congress delegated
authority to the FCC to “execute and enforce” the Communications Act,
which included promulgating rules and regulations, the FCC could be
entitled to receive deference.350 The majority found that the interpretation
regarding telecommunications services was formed pursuant to the FCC’s
expertise on the “technical and complex” telecommunication policy
addressed by the statute.351 Further, the agency used its expertise to
determine that, because of the market, broadband companies should not be
subject to common carrier regulations.352 This analysis cuts in favor of the
agency qualifying for deference under step one.
Second, the Court found that the respondents’ argument that the agency’s
interpretation was inconsistent with its past actions regarding common
carriers was not “a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s interpretation
under the Chevron framework.”353 So long as the agency explained its
reasoning, a change in policy would not preclude deference because Chevron
is designed to leave agencies discretion to modify a position, even if that
modification conflicts with a previous interpretation.354 Under strict
deference, such flip-flopping could be a basis for declining to extend
deference.355 However, the standard does not make this factor dispositive.
Instead, it requires courts to consider inconsistent positions and to do so
rigorously. Here, the Court did. It addressed why this factor did not counsel
against extending deference because the agency reasonably explained how it
reached its decision.356
Finally, the Court engaged in one other analysis to determine if deference
could be extended in this case. In the case below, the Ninth Circuit did not
grant deference to the FCC because the court believed that the agency’s
interpretation violated Ninth Circuit precedent.357 The Court found that to
be incorrect.358 A prior judicial construction of a statute supersedes an
agency’s construction “otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the
prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous
terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”359 Stated
otherwise, a court’s interpretation must completely close the statutory gap
350. Id. at 980 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 151).
351. Id. at 992.
352. See id. at 977.
353. Id. at 981.
354. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186 (1991) (rejecting the argument that, under
Chevron, an agency cannot receive deference if its interpretation is inconsistent with previous
interpretations).
355. See supra Part II.B.
356. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 997–1000.
357. See Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1131–32 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing
AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000)).
358. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980.
359. Id. at 982.
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for the agency to be precluded from receiving deference. In dissent, Justice
Scalia wrote that this holding would allow an agency to ignore judicial
precedent, making judicial opinions “subject to reversal by executive
officers.”360 This question regarding competing interpretations between
courts and agencies is not an enumerated factor under strict deference.
Nevertheless, this debate between Justices Thomas and Scalia is the type of
thorough review that should occur at strict deference’s step one.
Accordingly, the review here is commensurate with a strict deference
analysis.
ii. The Interpretive Tool Kit
In determining whether the statute was ambiguous, the majority brought
multiple tools of statutory interpretation to bear. Justice Thomas considered
the entire Communications Act, searching for defined terms and applying the
definitions to the language at issue.361 He then analyzed the statute’s
ordinary meaning to determine that a reasonable reader could interpret the
statute in multiple plausible ways.362 His analysis did not stop at this first
sign of ambiguity, however.
Justice Thomas consulted the
telecommunications industry’s regulatory history and determined that the
terms at issue were genuinely ambiguous.363 Further, he noted that Congress
was aware of this ambiguity and adopted it into the act when it was
ratified.364 Overall, Justice Thomas conducted a textual analysis by
considering the language at issue and the entirety of the statute to identify
whether any ambiguity existed. Once he determined ambiguity was present,
he confirmed that ambiguity by looking to regulatory history and
congressional intent. This analysis illustrates the Court’s use of its
interpretive tool kit and is consistent with strict deference’s step two.
iii. Reasonableness
The Court’s analysis is also consistent with step three. The majority
narrowed the ambiguity at issue to whether information and
telecommunications services were sufficiently integrated such that they
could not be regulated by common carrier requirements or whether the two
services were discrete, making them subject to common carrier regulation.365
By deciding that the services were sufficiently integrated, as the FCC did, the
agency limited its interpretive authority to the zone of ambiguity identified
by the Court. Taken together, this review contrasts with the cursory analysis

360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id. at 1016 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 989–91 (majority opinion).
See id.
See id. at 992–93.
See id. at 993.
See id. at 986.
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so often performed at Chevron step two366 and rises to the level of strict
deference.
C. The Compromise
These case studies demonstrate that strict deference is a rigorous standard
that would limit the frequency with which deference is awarded to
agencies.367 Although the result in Brand X likely would be the same, the
case studies show that had a court analyzed the agencies’ decisions in
Baldwin and Guedes through strict deference, deference likely would not
have been awarded.368 This focus on the outcome, however, does not directly
address the issues debated by the justices in Kisor concerning Auer and
deference in general.369 Deference—particularly in the Auer and Chevron
contexts—is criticized for the way in which interpretive authority is granted
to an agency.370 The question is whether this process, or the means, is
constitutionally permissible and can function without violating ratified
congressional statutes.371 While it can impact the ends, a unitary strict
deference standard can more importantly impact the means for cases
implicating Auer and cases in any other deference situation.
Strict deference ensures that judges cannot “abdicate”372 their
responsibility to authoritatively “say what the law is.”373 Under strict
deference, judges must assess whether deference is appropriate; whether
there is a true ambiguity in the statute or regulation; and whether the agency’s
interpretation narrowly addresses that ambiguity.374 Strict deference requires
judges to conduct an analysis to find meaning—to say what the law is—like
they do in cases outside the deference context.375 Strict deference pushes
judges to conduct their own independent analysis as opposed to relying on
an analysis done by the agency. This standard, then, changes the presumption
that agencies should receive deference unless proven otherwise to the
position that courts should retain interpretive power unless an agency can
demonstrate it made a reasoned, narrowly tailored interpretation of a
genuinely ambiguous statute.376
The shift towards the judiciary can ameliorate the concerns of the
antideference position.377 Because strict deference requires far more judicial
366. See, e.g., Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210,
1227–28 (11th Cir. 2009); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 3 F.3d 40, 49 (2d Cir. 1993).
367. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2418 (2019); id. at 2447 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
368. See supra Part III.B.
369. See supra Part II.
370. See supra Part II.B.
371. See supra Part II.
372. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2426 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
373. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
374. See supra Part I.B.
375. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (determining the meaning of
“tangible object” in 18 U.S.C. § 1519).
376. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2419.
377. See supra Part II.B.
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oversight than the traditional deference standards, courts will find the
meanings of statutes and regulations commensurate with the requirements in
section 706. Bringing a full arsenal of interpretive tools to bear will reveal
that many seemingly ambiguous rules are in fact not ambiguous.378
Therefore, the risk of violating separation of powers principles is
diminished;379 it is less likely that the governing body writing rules is also
interpreting them. Further, without Auer’s plainly erroneous standard, it is
more likely that agencies will pay the price for promulgating vague rules.380
Vague rules will be challenged, and because strict deference makes it less
likely that agencies will receive interpretive authority, the agency risks a
court making an unfavorable, binding interpretation of the rule. It would
behoove agencies to pursue notice and comment rules pursuant to section
553 and refrain from flip-flopping interpretations to avoid judicial
interference with their administrative mandates.
Despite its stringent requirements, strict deference can also appeal to the
prodeference position.381 The standard still offers the possibility that an
agency can receive deference if it makes an interpretation that is well
reasoned and narrowly tailored to a genuinely ambiguous rule. This
possibility means that if circumstances warrant it, the system can take
advantage of the agency’s technical expertise and experience in
administering complex schemes.382 Further, it continues to give Congress
the option to delegate interpretive authority to agencies when the legislature
believes that it is the agency, not the courts, that should be making
interpretive decisions.383
Finally, the case studies demonstrate that strict deference can apply in
cases beyond the Auer context. First, they illustrate that factors present in
Chevron analyses are directly addressed by the strict deference factors,
making strict deference a relevant test for Chevron cases.384 Second, the case
studies show that strict deference can resolve some of the deference issues
implicated by Chevron.385 Notably, strict deference can protect against the
reflexive deference exhibited in Baldwin by forcing courts to look beyond
the plain language of a statute.386 Further, by requiring genuine ambiguity,
strict deference incorporates the muscular type of Chevron review that can
protect against current concerns of judicial abdication.387 Strict deference
also formally incorporates limitations to Chevron like the major questions
doctrine, ensuring that agencies will only receive deference if Congress
really intended to delegate such authority. Finally, it incorporates the hard
378.
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look doctrine, proposed as a way to solve Chevron’s permissive step two.388
Accordingly, strict deference represents a compromise between Justices
Kagan and Gorsuch and their associated positions. The standard makes it
less likely, in all contexts, that deference will violate constitutional or
statutory provisions, while still making it possible to take advantage of the
benefits agencies offer.
CONCLUSION
Strict deference is a workable test to address the problems with deferring
to an agency’s interpretation of a statute or regulation. The test is a middle
ground, protecting against violations to constitutional and statutory
principles, while still making it possible to reap the benefits agencies can
provide. Kisor illustrates that the debate surrounding deference will not stop
at Auer and other deference contexts like Chevron could soon be reviewed as
well. Strict deference is a unitary deference standard that is not limited in its
application to Auer. Accordingly, strict deference offers a new way forward
for the Court, a framework through which it can address its outstanding
deference questions.

388. See supra Part I.A.2.

